Introduction
In recent decades,anumber of countries have instituted mechanisms for expanding participation in publichearings to support or even as an alternative to traditionalmechanisms of political representation and decision making. Such experiences cover a wide range of questions, including the environmentalagenda that also emerged at the fin-de-siècle.The normative dimensions of suchexperiments havegenerated extensivedebate, reaching into the very heart of social theory,as canbe verified by the repercussions from Habermas' work(e.g. Habermas 1984 ,1995 . However,less attention has been given to the empiricalexperienceofinitiatives whichendeavour toestablishprinciples for the democratisation of decisions.The purposeof this article is tocontribute to this debate withanin-depthanalysis of one of theseparticipativeexperiences.
The Brazilianl iteratureo n the practices of participativeconsultationand deliberationin the environmentalarenahas drawnconclusions which arebroadly similar to those that canbefound in internationalliterature(Alonsoand Costa 2002a). However,empiricaland sociological studies are scarce. Our objectivein this article is tocontribute to the understanding of the actualdynamics of mechanisms for broadening participation in environmentalquestions.
1 Our analysis investigates the operation of ane nvironmentalg overnance mechanismi nBrazil: the PublicH earing for EnvironmentalLicensing (Apla). Aplas arenonformalf orms of politicali ncorporation,open meetings that seek toexpand popular participation in the publicdiscussion of undertakings with potentiale nvironmental risk. Wee valuate the effectiveness of this "environmentalgovernance" institution as amechanismfor negotiation and deliberation among agents withadisparity of resources,its degree of influenceover the results of the environmentallicensing process and its capacity toinclude the interests and opinions of unorganised sectors of society, through ac ase study of the environmentallicensing process for the Rodoanel ,a ring-roadaround the SãoPaulo MetropolitanArea.
Our hypothesis is that,in Brazil,mechanisms for "deliberativedemocracy"applied toenvironmental questions havenot been very successfulin their objectiveofincorporating socialgroups usually excluded from t raditionalm echanisms of deliberation as relevant actors in the decision-making process.This is because suchg roups lack the economic, socialand cognitive resources that would enable them toparticipateactively and influence decisions on environmentalq uestions.As a consequence,Aplas tend toexpress the opinions of organised civil society more than thoseof the social groups that aredirectly affected.
Deliberativeprocesses between theory and practice
The concept of deliberativedemocracy developed out of critiques of the representative system. In general, this approach starts from Habermas'(1984) analysis of free communication among rational subjects as acondition for democraticdeliberation. According to this argument, the decision-making process in representativedemocracy is reduced to a simple aggregation of opinions, reflecting organised groups'interests.However, the point of departurei s not the decision-making spaces themselves,but distortions in the decision-making procedures within theseinstitutions.According to Habermas (1995) ,democracy,a s anormative principle and as politicalpractice,is not just defined by the type of procedure used for selecting leaders (political representation), the formof the decisionmaking process or the politicaland socialcontrol (accountability)of the elected leaders'actions. Democraticprocedures,he argues,are substantively defined as apublicforumopen to the free and disinterested exerciseofargument among citizens who aree qually free,fully informed,a nd spontaneously involved in deliberation on questions that concernacertain politicalcommunity.Amore "radical" version of this proposalis Cohen and Sabel' s (1997) model of deliberativedemocracy. They propose that the deliberativep rocess be incorporated into the effectiveprocess of political decision making in aninstitutionalarrangement which they call 'Directly DeliberativePolyarchy'.
Theories of deliberativedemocracy havebeen the target of muchcriticism. For example, Przeworski (1998) argues that it is false to suppose that every deliberativeprocess always results in a better decision thanone taken from aggregating individual votes.Deliberativeprocesses only result in achange of the agents'positions when thereis anasymmetry of information. Only in suchcases is it reasonable toe xpect that someone might consider anoppositeargument as superior to theirs. But in this case, the groups that arebetter informed, morequalified toargueand equipped with the most resources (like education and time) would beina better position to" convince" others of the superiority of their arguments,even when these involvelosses for them.
Recent empirical studies of deliberativeprocesses in the environmentalarena seem toconfirm these criticisms.Inacomparative study of 'deliberative inclusionary processes'(DIPs)inenvironmental questions,Holmes and Scoones (2000)mapped a large number of experiences during the 1980s and 1990s as well as a wide diversity of models and applied t echniques.The authors observed differences among deliberativeprocesses used in countries in the northernhemisphereand thosein the south. In the first group,DIPs resulted from activismon the part of civil society against the ineffectiveness and illegitimacy of traditional mechanisms.In the second set, they were the product of negotiations between localand internationaln on-governmentalo rganisations (NGOs)in the process of elaborating localpublic policies in order toinclude socially,politically and economically marginalised segments, where the emphasis on sustainable localdevelopment stresses "community empowerment"mechanisms.
In spiteo f the diversity in procedures,a ll deliberativeprocesses try toattain one or moreof four basicobjectives:(1) production of information to subsidise the governmentaldecision-making process; (2)consulting interested parties on policies proposed by government agents; (3)monitoring and supervising policies implemented by the public power; (4) deciding whichp olicies will be implemented by the publicauthorities or by NGOs or community organisations.It should be emphasised,however, that only the last of these objectives completely fulfils the requirements of deliberativedemocracy.
The practicalo peration of deliberative mechanisms is far from fulfilling the expectations implied by theseo bjectives.On the issueo f representativeness,all face the same basicdilemma: if it is not possible toguarantee that all potentially interested parties will participate,how should participants be selected? Inpractice,a selection method close to the representative system has prevailed, wherei ndividuals and associations representing the groups involved areinvited to participate. This results in problems similar to those identified in traditional representative systems by proponents of deliberatived emocracy.Two criticisms havebeen levelled at this "induced participation". The first is that the creation of artificialconditions for participation and deliberation may ensureamorebalanced representation of the different social segments,but it cannot prevent thosehigher upin the social hierarchy from controlling the deliberativeprocess. The second concerns the lackoflegitimacy of these processes when the participants do not clearly see the influenceof their participation on governments' politicaland administrativedecisions (Cornwall 2000) . The degree of motivation in participating depends on the perception of the relevanceof the deliberativeprocess to the finaldecision (Holmes and Scoones 2000) . Even when the selection of participants is representative, the motivation for participating varies between organised groups and "common citizens". While the former havedefined opinions, since they areprofessionally involved with the issues, the latter may havedifficulties in building and presenting their arguments.
The thirdproblem concerns the effectiveness of deliberativeprocesses.Here,also, the evidence found in the literatureindicates results that are the oppositeof what would beexpected from the theory. The most frequent problems refer to the control of the agendaby state representatives, whichcanboth induceconsensual results and hinder the discussion of unforeseen themes,leaving little room for substantivedebateover contrasting arguments.As a result of this factor,processes can result either in formalconsensus on very general themes or in open conflicts that usually demand arbitration by the government bureaucracy or even the courts.
Finally, t he evidence s uggests that these mechanisms may havea secondary influenceon publicpolicy outcomes.Here thereis aparadox. Ine stablishing processes tocompensatef or asymmetries in power and information, whether by selecting participants from among the excluded socialgroups or by creating mechanisms tobring thesegroups into the debate, theseprocesses lose the legitimacy necessary for the conclusions of their deliberations tobebinding. Inpractice,most of thesee xperiments havebeen limited t o accomplishing information-sharing and advisory objectives.
Dynamics of participation in environmentalpublichearings: the caseof the Aplas on the Rodoanel
Since the 1980s, therehas been anexpansion of socialparticipation in environmentaldecisionmaking processes in Brazil. The 1988 Constitution consolidated the legaland institutionalframework for the decision-making process around environmentalissues,establishing third-generation rights (including the right toahealthy environment), institutionalising mechanisms top unish environmental violations (the PublicInterest Action and the PublicCivil Action) and creating institutions tomediateconflicts (the PublicProsecutor' s Office). Inaddition, the legal requirement toproducean environmentali mpact report (EIA-RIMA) was established,expanding publicaccountability in the caseofprocesses involving possible environmental risks,along withprovision for publichearings for environmentallicensing (Aplas).
The objectiveofAplas is tofacilitatepopular participationin the process of decision making on projects involving potentialenvironmental risks. Aplas aredefined by federallegislation in ageneric way,as participatory and public spaces,intended togive transparency to the decision-making process. They areorganised by the government agency responsible for granting environmentallicenses for the purposeofdiscussing the environmentalimpact report (RIMA),produced by the agency responsible for the project.Aplas areintended toinclude anew set of actors in publicdiscussion of environmental questions: the socialgroups facing environmental risks.The legislation guarantees toany civil association or group withaminimummembership of 50 citizens the right todemand anApla todebate aRIMA.If they are tobeeffectiveinfulfilling their function of including the affected population,Aplas have tomeet twokey criteria: they should beboth well publicised and easily accessible. The law gives considerable autonomy to the States (sinceBrazil is afederation) toestablishlocal rules for Aplas, and this has generated a variety of formats.
Formally,A plas haveamerely informative character.However,any suggestions and criticism resulting from thesemeetings should be recorded in the minutes and taken intoaccount in the decisions of the legale nvironmentalo rgans. Nevertheless,legalprovision for this does not by itself guarantee that participation will beeffective, and still less that it will bedemocratic.Thus we chose toinvestigateparticipation in thesehearings by focusing on their actualoperation. Inorder to understand the dynamics of participation we selected acase whichcould potentially havebeen the focus of environmentalconflicts: the Aplas held before the construction of the SãoPaulo Rodoanel.
The Rodoanel is alarge (137 km) orbital road circling the metropolitanperimeters of Greater São Paulo.It was launched by the publicauthorities in the mid-1990s, with the objectiveofconnecting the ten biggest highways that link the metropolitanarea with the rest of the country,improving the traffic flow in the stateo fSãoPaulo and reducing congestion in the urbanareas of Greater SãoPaulo. Thereis still no finaldefinition of the complete route. The project was divided intofour large sections, withimmediatepriority being given to the western section. The western section project potentially affected both the naturalenvironment and resident populations (including the removalofaround 2,000 families). The SãoPaulo stategovernment was responsible for the Rodoanel project, through Dersa, the technicaldepartment in charge of proposing the route, removing the affected families and contracting the construction firms tobuild the road,as well as organising the Aplas.
Profile of potentialparticipants in the Rodoanel Aplas
Inorder toestablish whether the Aplas areeffective in broadening socialparticipation in processes of environmentaldeliberation, weapproached this case with twoquestions.First,did the socialgroups directly affected by the Rodoanel (west section) have the materialand cognitive resources toenable them toparticipateinAplas?Second,is the institutional design of Aplas permeable to the participation of the lower social strata?Inorder toanswer the first question, wei nvestigated the profile of the population directly affected by the Rodoanel.The second question was addressed through ananalysis of the internaldynamics of the Rodoanel Aplas and anevaluation of participation as it actually took placein the publichearings.
Our starting-point was therefore the potential participants' socio-economicprofile. The profile of the socialgroups affected is important to understand the Aplas'dynamics becausedifferences in income and education levels strongly condition the individual capabilities required in mobilisation processes.We used a survey 2 tobuild upa socio-economicprofile of the affected socialgroups,as well as profiling their values and opinions about the Rodoanel and about the participatory process itself. Wediscovered that the socialgroups affected by the Rodoanel, who would potentially participateinAplas, wereonaverage lowincome families,living in self-constructed housing; 53.2 per cent did not haveaformaljoband 63.3 per cent hadprimary education only.
Inaddition to socio-economicc onditions, people' s reasons for engaging in the participatory process may beassociated with their willingness to participateincommunity and associativeactivities and t heir knowledge of mechanisms of participation. Politicalculture theoreticians (e.g. Putnam1996)believe that a set of values ("civic culture") leads to the success of participatory practices and institutions.We tested for this empirically by asking people about their motivation top articipatei ncommunity and associative activities.Wef ound ahigh level of potential participation:80 per cent said they would participateinactivities to solvealocalproblem.
Inaddition to values, the mobilisation of social groups in environmental riskareas requires the deployment of cognitive resources tobuild upand express their opinions.The effectiveparticipation of these socialgroups in Aplas would depend on their capacity toclassify adimension of social reality as "environmental". Henceparticipation in the Rodoanel Aplas would requirep erception of environmental risks as well as a willingness to participate("civicculture") and knowledge of Aplas. Although inhabitants of the areas affected by the Rodoanel identified environmentalproblems that affected them directly,especially forms of pollution, most of them (77.6 per cent)considered the environmentalquality of their neighbourhood to befair or good. Thus, the affected groups did not construct aperception of the Rodoanel either as causing an"environmentalproblem" or as negatively affecting their living conditions, which would have been motives tomobiliseand toparticipateinpublic hearings.Another cognitive resourceis the level of information about environmentalp roblems, campaigns and institutions.Only 10 per cent of interviewees claimed knowledge of environmental issues,but 93.5 per cent of them hadheardabout the Rodoanel (although 22.8 per cent of them had anincorrect understanding of what it was). The crucialcognitive resource,a wareness of the mechanismofparticipation, was lacking:96 per cent hadnever heardabout Aplas.Amongst the remaining 4per cent,46.6 per cent defined them as a way to transmit information while about a third stated that Aplas wereadeliberativeinstitution. A further 16 per cent stated that they hadnofaithat all in Aplas'efficacy.As wecan see from this,affected groups lacked bothaperception of the Rodoanel' s environmental risks and the cognitive resources that would haveenabled their participation in the Aplas.
The situation with regard to their political resources was even less favourable. According to PoliticalProcess theory (Tilly et al. 1997) , social groups withprevious enrolment in associations and publicactivities placemorefaithin the possibility of modifying processes through debatein the public sphereand in taking part in participatory institutions and mobilisation processes in order todo so. In this sense,pre-existing associativenetworks are resources that facilitateparticipation. Wefound that while most of the groups affected by the Rodoanel engagedincommunity activities(74.4 per cent),just 12.1 per cent werepart of associative networks and formalassociations.The effectiveness of past participation alsocreates incentives for further participation; the more successfulgroups havebeen in having their demands met, the more confident they will bein their capacity toinfluence processes in debatei n the public sphere. The majority of interviewees hadn ever presented demands toany institution; of those who had, 64.7 per cent hadnot seen their problems solved. What is more, when asked who should solvean environmentalproblem that affected them, the majority indicated apublicauthority.Despite the fact that it has not been satisfactorily addressing their claims, they still trust in the state rather than in self-organisation as the channel to solveproblems (only 6.5 per cent said they would actively engage in problem-solving activities).
Wecanconclude from this review of the profile of affected socialgroups that they lacked botha clear perception of environmentalproblems and the necessary mobilisation resources.They did not know about or haveaccess tomeans of expressing opinions and raising complaints, whether through statechannels or through associativeforms.What is more, they hadfew incentives toparticipatein institutionallife, since when they haddone soin the past they had reaped few results.As might have been expected given theseelements,only 5.4 per cent of the groups affected by the Rodoanel participated in the Aplas, whichdiscussed the project' s environmentaland socialimpacts.
Dynamics of participation in the Rodoanel publichearings
Beforeanalysing the dynamics of the participation inside the Rodoanel Aplas,it is important first to examine the way in whichAplas aref ormally organised in the stateofSãoPaulo. The objectiveof the publichearing is given as being toinformand todiscuss with the population the possible impacts of certain activities or projects,as well as to receive suggestions.According tolegal requirements, the Aplas must beheld in the municipality or area directly affected by the project under discussion,in aplace that is easily accessible. Although the event is publicand open,government authorities (state governor, senators, stateand federald eputies, mayors, state secretaries and city councillors of the affected municipalities),members of environmental committees,publicprosecutors and civil society representatives (from environmentaland nonenvironmentalNGOs and the media)are specifically invited toattend. The hearings areformally organised as set out in Table 1. A totalof920 people came to the three public hearings held for the licensing of the western section of the Rodoanel; considering the huge number of citizens affected by the project, 3 a very limited number.TheseAplas took placein the twolargest cities affected by the project,SãoPaulo (siteof two Aplas attended by 466 and 267 people respectively) and Osasco(siteof the last Apla, attended by 187 people). However, the meeting locations werefar from the homes of the directly affected population in thosemunicipalities,and four of the six affected municipalities hadnopublichearing at all. The Aplas wereheld at night,beginning at 7.00pm and ending atabout midnight,discouraging those who had to start workearly in the morning from staying until the end. Inaddition,despite the fact that the law requires Aplaannouncements tobepublished in popular newspapers, wefound them only in the officialgazette.
Insteadoflocalaffected groups forming the majority, representatives of politicalauthorities comprised 57.5 per cent,42.6 per cent,and 45.7 per cent respectively of thosepresent at eachApla. Two subcategories prevailed:members of the municipaland stateexecutivebranches (Table 2) . While civil society associations accounted for 42.5 per cent,57.4 per cent,and 54.3 per cent of those present in eachApla, local residents'associations accounted for only 4.8 per cent,8per cent and 7.1 per cent respectively, while the participation of individual residents was 7 per cent and 13 per cent in the first twoAplas and just 2.1 per cent in the last one. Environmentalists accounted for 2.9 per cent and 2.5 per cent of thosepresent at the first twoAplas,but their participation reached 12.9 per cent at the last one,demonstrating the progressive construction of anenvironmentaldebatearound the Rodoanel project.
When weconsider not only presence,but active participationinAplas as a speaker,numbers are even lower.Of the 920 persons present at the three events,only58 spoke out,around 6 per cent of the total. Members of civil associations (most of them from non-environmental socialmovements) took the majority of the time available for discussion during the three Rodoanel Aplas (Table 3 ). The Aplas' objectiveofensuring local residents'participation was not achieved,as they made only two speeches. Although there was civil society participation in the discussion,it was balanced by the number of speeches made by government officials and bureaucrats in charge of the project, which accounted for 35per cent of the total. Thesed ata show us that the Aplas did not function as achannel for local residents' views. However,even with the very small number of residents present it might havebeen possible for them toexpress disagreements and todiscuss the advantages and problems which the Rodoanel project represented for them. This did not happen. During the Aplas, the general tone of the speeches was favourable to the project.Pro-Rodoanel actors,i.e. businesspeople,members of the statebureaucracy, municipalexecutives and representatives,presented technical statements in favour of the project, such as its impact on improving transportation conditions and localeconomicdevelopment.While this was fully tobeexpected,it is striking that even the affected socialgroups (local residents and members of neighbourhood associations)did not criticise the project.Ingeneral, their speeches focused on requesting anexplanation for the displacements and ascertaining what compensation they would receive. Only the members of environmentaland other socialmovements argued against the project, but they focused on technicalobjections in defence of environmentalpreservation.
Wecanconclude that from the point of view of their internaldynamics the Aplas did not function as "deliberativearenas". They did not fulfil the criteria of publicity and accessibility.Their location and schedule limited the participation of the affected groups, whichcould be seen as part of agovernment strategy toprevent large-scale popular participation. Our contention is that the institutionaldesign and formalo rganisation of the Aplas represented a significant constraint on the involvement of social groups withlower educationallevels,including the fact that while the authorities and organised civil society hadaguaranteed space tocommunicate their opinions during the courseof the meeting, affected socialgroups hadonly a short time for individual statements at the end of the Apla to present their opinions.Given their format and the profile of the participants, wecandescribe the Rodoanel Aplas as functioning as ac hannel for information from the authorities to the local residents and civil society associations.The participatory process itself did not generateany significant changes in the originalproject,and the Aplas did not serve as forafor gathering information and suggestions from local residents whichcould havehelped to improve the project.Nothing discussed in the Aplas was included in t he t echnical r eport that accompanied the subsequent granting of pre-license approvalfor the western section of the Rodoanel .
The politicalprocess beyond the Aplas
The dynamics of the Rodoanel Aplas canbe explained by various factors.One is the behaviour of the actors themselves.The massivepresenceof members of the publicadministration and the state executivegaveanofficialcharacter to the hearings, while the strategies employed by proponents of the Rodoanel hadademobilising effect and hindered the emergenceofconflicts that could havearisen at the Aplas under other circumstances.The limited access to resources on the part of the affected groups on t he one hand,a nd t he absenceo f t he construction of ac oherent "environmental objection" on the other,inhibited moreactive participationby twogroups of actors with reasons for opposing the project: the affected groups facing removaland the environmentalmovement. Inaddition, the government agency Dersa adopted strategies which"emptied" the Aplas of their status as the key arena.The environmental impact study was technically very sound,and an effectivemass advertisingcampaign for the Rodoanel was conducted to sway publicopinion (Alonsoand Costa 2002b) . But the most important factor was Dersa's initiativeo fm ultiplying the project's negotiation arenas,according to the target public in eacharea.Dersaavoided direct negotiations with the socialgroups facing removaland created an alternativeinstrument to the publichearings,"prehearings",a s aforumf or direct dialogue with organised localelites. 4 At the same time as Dersa was insisting on negotiating the removaloffamilies affected by the project on acase-by-casebasis, the agency ensured that, unlike the Aplas, the prehearings functioned as ane ffectivef orumf or negotiating and legitimising the project.In these fora unofficialcommitments weremade, resulting in small modifications to the originalplan that incorporated demands for facilitating access tocities and neighbourhoods as well as local urban improvements.From this process emerged the final version of the project, whichis currently being implemented. As apolitical strategy, the pre-hearings wereh ighly effectivebecause they disarmed potentialopposition and facilitated the process of environmentallicensing. They werecrucialas much for producing publiclegitimisation of the project as they wereinavoiding apossible mobilisation of the localelites on behalf of the affected socialgroups. By holding pre-hearings,Dersa thus effectively emptied the Aplas of their politicalimportance.
In synthesis, the dynamics of the Rodoanel Aplas canbeexplained not only by their institutional format and the performanceof the agents within it, but alsoby the government' s strategy of promoting prior negotiations withpre-organised elites.In this sense, the Aplas weren ot a venuef or open confrontation or for negotiations among equals with consensual results.They became basically ceremonial arenas in whichparticipation was ritualised.
Conclusions
Wecanconclude from this study of the dynamics of the Aplas that in the caseof the Rodoanel they werenot able toensureeffectiveparticipation by ordinary citizens in the environmentallicensing process of alarge-scale project.The Aplas functioned as a venuefor publicising technicalinformation and legitimising politicaldecision making that was basically confined togovernment offices.In this sense, they fulfilled apedagogical,informativeand advisory function and it is significant that the public discussion forumimposed limits on the excessive useo f t echnicalarguments, r equiring t he establishment of aminimumlevel of dialogue using clear and accessible language. Nevertheless,even if formal requirements were tobeimproved and followed strictly, we would not expect massiveand activeparticipation on the part of affected citizens. First,because the socio-educationalprofile of most citizens means that they feel unable todiscuss public issues as equals withformalauthorities.Second, because the dynamics of politicallife suggest that most people would prefer todelegatepower to the authorities in charge toact on their behalf rather thanbecoming politically active,even if sometimes the results do not meet their expectations.This is the way the representative system works.
Finally, t he balanceo fe xperiences with deliberativeprocesses (Cornwall 2000; Holmes and Scoones 2000) confirms our findings.Most institutionaldesigns of deliberativemechanisms face common difficulties in practice. Thereis a selection bias favouring the moreorganised groups among participants and therearealso socio-economicand cognitiveasymmetries, whicharehard toavoid. Hence, twoopposite tendencies emerge. On the one hand,authorities try toinduceconsensus through seeking tocontrol the agenda.On the other, their conflict-resolution strategy is a very traditionalone: arbitration through public(bureaucraticor judiciary) authorities insteadof"argumentativeconsensus". Wecanalsoadd that the low legitimacy of these mechanisms contributes tolimiting their influence on environmentalpublicpolicies.
Despite the fact that formal requirements were largely followed, the Aplas did not result in a consensus incorporating all positions in the debate. Ingeneral,our findings suggest that deliberative and participation mechanisms areaffected by asymmetries in s ocio-economicpower and organisationaland cognitive resources as well as in agendapower.In short, they have the same problems that deliberativedemocracy' s theoreticians havebeen associating w ith" traditional" representativemechanisms. 3.The totalp opulation directly affected by the western section of the Rodoanel was estimated at 1,818,363 inhabitants,living in six municipalities.
